Conspiracy Speech: Reimagining the First Amendment in the Age of QAnon by Hyland, Justin
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal 
Volume 44 
Number 1 Winter 2021 Article 2 
Winter 2021 
Conspiracy Speech: Reimagining the First Amendment in the Age 
of QAnon 
Justin Hyland 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_comm_ent_law_journal 
 Part of the Communications Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, and the 
Intellectual Property Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Justin Hyland, Conspiracy Speech: Reimagining the First Amendment in the Age of QAnon, 44 HASTINGS 
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1 (2021). 
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_comm_ent_law_journal/vol44/iss1/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal by an authorized 
editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu. 
 
[1] 
Conspiracy Speech: Reimagining the First 





* University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D., 2021; Fordham University, B.A., 2014.  I 
would like to thank Professor Hillary Greene for her guidance and direction throughout the writing 
process.  Tremendous gratitude is also due to Emily Horne, An Le, Carlos Trejo, and the entire 
CommEnt Law Journal for their diligent work on this article.  Finally, I would like to especially thank 
James Hyland, Lucille Hyland, Qing Wai Wong, and Archie for their unwavering support and 
encouragement.  All errors and omissions are my own. 
2 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 44:1 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION .......................................................................... 3 
II.  DEFINING CONSPIRACY SPEECH ................................................ 5 
III.  DOCTRINAL HISTORY ................................................................ 8 
A. Unlawful Advocacy ........................................................... 8 
B. False Speech..................................................................... 12 
IV.      CONSPIRACY SPEECH ISSUES UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT 14 
A. Doctrinal Problems .......................................................... 14 
1. Unlawful Advocacy .................................................... 14 
2. False Speech ............................................................... 17 
B. Marketplace of Ideas ........................................................ 19 
V.  EXISTING SCHOLARSHIP .......................................................... 26 
A. Judicial Solutions ............................................................. 26 
1. Overrule Brandenburg ................................................ 26 
2. Maintain Brandenburg ................................................ 29 
B. Legislative ........................................................................ 30 
VI.      PROPOSED SOLUTION .............................................................. 32 
A. Proposed Model ............................................................... 32 
1. Intentional Proliferation .............................................. 32 
2. Factual Falsity............................................................. 35 
3. History of Violence .................................................... 37 
B. Areas of Concern ............................................................. 38 
VII.  CONCLUSION ........................................................................... 40 
  
Winter 2021               REIMAGINING THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN THE AGE OF QANON 3 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In November of 2020, Neely Petrie-Blanchard journeyed from 
Kentucky to Florida on a very specific mission.1  She was to meet with a man 
named Christopher Hallett.2  A mother of two, Petrie-Blanchard had lost 
custody of her twin daughters for reasons that remain unclear.  Hallett had 
promised to get them back.3   
In the intervening years, between when Petrie-Blanchard lost custody 
and her trip to Florida, she had come to blame the government for the 
breakdown of her family.4  Her misgivings, however, were not typical 
criticisms of the American justice system.  She was not preoccupied with 
burdensome legal realities—the onerous process and structural inequity—
that come to frustrate many litigants.  There was something deeper at play.  
Rather, Petrie-Blanchard believed that the government was actively 
conspiring to keep her children from her.5  And this conspiracy threatened 
more than custodial deprivation.  Under government watch, anything could 
happen to her children.  They could be starved, abused, even trafficked.6  
This fear of government—indeed, fear of what the government would do to 
her children—drove Petrie-Blanchard to extreme ends.  Even before 
travelling to Florida, she had been arrested for abducting her daughters from 
their grandmother’s house.7  Out on bail, and at the end of her line, Petrie-
Blanchard turned to Hallett.   
Hallett was a self-proclaimed legal expert—an internet charlatan 
holding himself out as a skilled child-custody advocate.8  He had amassed a 
considerable reputation in Florida through offering dubious legal services to 
desperate mothers like Petrie-Blanchard.9  Hallett ran his business by 
convincing these women that they were “sovereign citizens.”10  This theory 
holds that individuals are not answerable to statutes or court orders, but 
rather their own interpretations of the common law.11  Further, he claimed 
that former President Trump had charged him creating a separate legal 
 
 1. Will Sommer, QAnon Mom Arrested for Murder of Fringe Legal Theorist, DAILY BEAST (Nov. 
17, 2020, 9:01 PM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/qanon-mom-arrested-for-murder-of-fringe-legal-
theorist-in-florida. 
 2. Id.   
 3. Id.   
 4. Id.   
 5. Id.   
 6. Kevin Roose, What Is QAnon, the Viral Pro-Trump Conspiracy Theory?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/article/what-is-qanon.html.   
 7. Sommer, supra note 1.   
 8. Id.   
 9. Id.   
 10. Id. 
 11. Sovereign Citizens Movement, S. POVERTY L. CTR., https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-
hate/extremist-files/ideology/sovereign-citizens-movement (last visited May 9, 2021). 
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system to help parents regain custody of their children.12  Despite the 
universal failure of his legal services, he continued to amass clients.13 
Petrie-Blanchard would turn out to be his last.  At some point during 
their meeting, the interaction turned fatal.14  Indeed, Petrie-Blanchard had 
come to believe that Hallett was actually working for the government, rather 
than against it.15  She perceived him as directly involved in the plot to keep 
her children away from her.16  When this realization dawned on her, Petrie-
Blanchard resorted to violence.  She shot Hallett multiple times in the back 
until he died.17 
While this appears to be the tragic tale between two Americans citizens, 
the story’s true protagonist is the cyber conspiracy QAnon.  QAnon posits 
that an elite network of entrenched government actors runs a child sex-
trafficking ring.18  Although the theory has no grounding in objective reality, 
it has inspired and mobilized countless individuals toward political 
extremism and violence.19  Indeed, both Hallett and Petrie-Blanchard were 
staunch believers in the theory.20  Faith in QAnon warped their worldviews, 
brought them together, and ultimately catalyzed their violent encounter.  
Their story is far from unique. 
Conspiracy theory is now a daily aspect of American life.21  The advent 
of the internet has allowed misinformation, masquerading as fact, to 
proliferate at an unprecedented clip.  Some theories are basically innocuous 
outside their capacity to cause confusion.  Others, such as QAnon, inspire 
tremendous harm.  The dissemination of such expression has been linked to 
numerous instances of violence, including the Capitol Riots in January 
2021.22  This article will explore these emerging online conspiracies as they 
relate to the First Amendment.  Despite the breadth of free speech 
jurisprudence, little has been written on the subject of conspiracy.  My 
position is that First Amendment doctrine, as it stands, is inadequate to 
 
 12. Sommer, supra note 1.   
 13. Id.   
 14. Id. 
 15. Id.   
 16. Id.   
 17. Id.   
 18. Roose, supra note 6. 
 19. Lois Beckett, QAnon: A Timeline of Violence Linked to the Conspiracy Theory, GUARDIAN (Oct. 
16, 2020, 10:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/oct/15/qanon-violence-crimes-
timeline. 
 20. Sommer, supra note 1. 
 21. Max Fisher, ‘Belonging Is Stronger than Facts’: The Age of Misinformation, N.Y. TIMES (May 
7, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/07/world/asia/misinformation-disinformation-fake-
news.html; Rachel Hope Cleves, Why Americans Turn to Conspiracy Theories, WASH. POST. (Oct. 21, 
2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/10/21/why-americans-turn-conspiracy-theories/.   
 22. Olivia Rubin et al., QAnon Emerges as Recurring Theme of Criminal Cases Tied to US Capitol 
Siege, ABC NEWS (Jan. 19, 2021, 4:31 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/qanon-emerges-recurring-
theme-criminal-cases-tied-us/story?id=75347445.   
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address concerns posed by this speech.  Despite its capacity for social harm, 
conspiracy speech currently finds protection within the free speech 
landscape.  As these cyber conspiracies continue to pose new and unique 
problems, First Amendment law must evolve in kind to regulate such speech. 
My argument will proceed as follows. Part II will define “conspiracy 
speech” as it is imagined in this article.  Specifically, the speech at issue is 
empirically-presented, disseminated online, and associated with violent 
action.  Part III assesses where conspiracy speech fits into contemporary First 
Amendment doctrine.  In particular, online conspiracy theory will be 
measured against the modern standards for unlawful advocacy and false 
speech.  Part IV explores new First Amendment concerns posed by 
conspiracy speech.  Here, I argue that conspiracy speech triggers various 
“market failures” within the marketplace of ideas.  Contending that market 
failure sets the stage for regulation, this section claims that government 
intervention is necessary to curb conspiracy speech.  Part V provides a 
topography of recent academic treatment in the field of electronic incitement.  
Finally, in Part VI, I offer a novel judicial test for regulating online 
conspiracy speech.   
II. DEFINING CONSPIRACY SPEECH 
Before assessing where conspiracy theories fit within First Amendment 
law, it is important to clarify how this article defines “conspiracy speech.”  
Conspiracies exist in various shapes and forms.  Not beholden to any 
particular viewpoint, they transcend ideology and political leaning.  
Sometimes these theories are relegated to the far corners of social thought, 
operating sub rosa amongst ideological minorities.  Other times, they occupy 
a prominent place in the public discourse, captivating the attention of 
mainstream audiences.  Many conspiracies are relatively benign, 
characterized more by their eccentricity than their capacity for social injury.  
The Flat Earth and staged lunar landing theories seem to fit this category.23  
Others, such as Holocaust and Sandy Hook denial, are blatantly destructive 
and cause immense psychic harm to survivors and family members.24   
 
 23. Rob Picheta, The Flat-Earth Conspiracy Is Spreading Around the Globe. Does it Hide a Darker 
Core?, CNN (Nov. 18, 2019, 10:37 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/16/us/flat-earth-conference-
conspiracy-theories-scli-intl; Richard Godwin, One Giant…Lie? Why So Many People Still Think the 
Moon Landings Were Faked, GUARDIAN (July 10, 2019, 10:00 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/science/2019/jul/10/one-giant-lie-why-so-many-people-still-think-the-
moon-landings-were-faked. 
 24. Adam G. Klein, How to Fight Holocaust Denial in Social Media—With the Evidence of What 
Really Happened, THE CONVERSATION (Dec. 3, 2020, 1:39 PM), https://theconversation.com/how-to-
fight-holocaust-denial-in-social-media-with-the-evidence-of-what-really-happened-150719; Susan 
Svrluga, First, They Lost Their Children. Then the Conspiracy Theories Started. Now, the Parents of 
Newtown are Fighting Back, WASH. POST. (July 8, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/first-they-lost-their-children-then-the-conspiracies-
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This article takes a narrower approach. Rather than assess the First 
Amendment’s relation to conspiracy theory generally, I will focus on the 
recent phenomena of QAnon and Pizzagate.  At a high level, both theories 
claim that high-ranking political elites belong to a global cabal of child sex 
predators.25  Pizzagate emerged from a Clinton campaign email hack, which 
was subsequently published by Wikileaks in November 2016.26  Proponents 
of the theory believed that the emails contained coded messages linking 
Democratic Party operatives to human sex trafficking.27  This conjecture 
proliferated on online message boards, eventually identifying the Comet 
Ping Pong pizzeria in Washington D.C. as a place of ritual abuse.28  
Believing this to be true, Edgar Welch traveled from North Carolina to the 
nation’s capital intending to liberate the trafficked children.29  Upon arrival, 
Welch fired an AR-15 assault rifle into Comet Ping Pong.   
QAnon also posits the existence of pedophilic network of elites, but its 
claims are more widespread.30  Followers not only believe that these elites 
conduct a Satanic sex-trafficking ring, but that they also direct global 
politics, transnational media conglomerates, and sites of cultural production, 
such as Hollywood.31  Unique to QAnon is the role played by ex-President 
Trump.  Followers believe Trump was chosen by military operatives to 
expose the evil cabal’s wrongdoing.32  This day of reckoning—known as the 
“Storm”—is said to culminate with the public arrest, imprisonment, and 
execution of thousands of cabal members, subjecting them to military 
tribunals and martial law.33  Information pertaining to the Storm is revealed 
through a series of cryptic online messages by an anonymous poster named 
“Q”34  Believing Q to possess government secrets, followers analyze and 
interpret these “Q drops” in search of hidden meanings.35 While QAnon 
theories originated on the anonymous imageboard, 4Chan, it has since spread 
to mainstream websites such as Twitter and Facebook.36  The similarity 
 
started-now-the-parents-of-newtown-are-fighting-back/2019/07/08/f167b880-9cef-11e9-9ed4-
c9089972ad5a_story.html.   
 25. Michael E. Miller, Pizzagate’s Violent Legacy, WASH. POST (Feb. 16, 2021), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2021/02/16/pizzagate-qanon-capitol-attack/. 
 26. Id.   
 27. Id.   
 28. Id.   
 29. Id.   
 30. Roose, supra note 6.   
 31. Id.   
 32. Id.   
 33. Id.   
 34. Q is a reference to Q clearance, the security clearance required to access Top Secret government 
information.   
 35. Adrienne LaFrance, The Prophecies of Q, THE ATLANTIC (June 2020), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/06/qanon-nothing-can-stop-what-is-
coming/610567/.   
 36. Id.   
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between the two theories is far from coincidental, as Pizzagate is generally 
considered to have morphed into QAnon over time.37  More generally, both 
theories borrow heavily from anti-Semitic tropes and inspire a near-religious 
dedication amongst their followers.38 
I focus on these theories for a few reasons.  First, recent events—most 
prominently the Capitol Riots—reveal these theories to be an emerging 
social threat.  QAnon has been broadly linked to the riots, with some 
perpetrators claiming the theory incited their behavior.39  Second, these 
conspiracies raise unique First Amendment concerns.  Understanding the 
nature of these theories—in particular the characteristics that set them apart 
from other conspiracies—will better inform their treatment under current 
free speech doctrine. 
“Conspiracy Speech,” for the purpose of this article, is categorized by 
three basic criteria.  (1) The speech is presented empirically rather than 
ideologically.40  Put another way, conspiracies such as QAnon and Pizzagate 
are asserted as factual in nature.  Rather than advocate a particular viewpoint, 
they lay claim to objective reality, purporting to describe things as they 
actually are.41  Unlike ideology, therefore, these conspiracies can be factually 
rebutted as false.  Additionally, in more cases than not, these theories are 
fairly easily disproven.  QAnon and Pizzagate do not lay claim to nebulous 
factual realms where a statement’s validity is difficult to prove either way.42  
Instead, as David Han describes, such theories exist in the “realm of 
demonstrable falsity.”43  (2) The speech is associated with violent action.  As 
stated above, several violent crimes have been linked to QAnon, Pizzagate, 
and similar theories.44  These theories produce real-world harms that 
transcend psychological or informational injury.  This violent potential 
distinguishes these conspiracies from their less-threatening counterparts.  
While the speech itself may cause abstract injury–—such as obfuscating 
truth or injuring the democratic process45—it is most dangerous when 
 
 37. Miller, supra note 25.   
 38. Rachel E. Greenspan, QAnon Builds on Centuries of Anti-Semitic Conspiracy Theories that Put 
Jewish People at Risk, INSIDER (Oct. 24, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.insider.com/qanon-conspiracy-
theory-anti-semitism-jewish-racist-believe-save-children-2020-10; Nina Burleigh, #Pizzagate 
Resurfaces an Old Anti-Semitic Slander, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 6, 2016, 1:58 PM), 
https://www.newsweek.com/pizzagate-resurfaces-anti-semitic-slander-528950.   
 39. Rubin et al., supra note 22.   
 40. See David S. Han, Conspiracy Theories and the Marketplace of Facts, 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 
178, 184 (2017). 
 41. Id. at 184. 
 42. Id. at 182. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Beckett, supra note 19; Brian Stelter, Fake News, Real Violence:’Pizzagate’ and the 
Consequences of an Internet Echo Chamber, CNN BUS. (Dec. 6, 2016, 9:30 AM), 
https://money.cnn.com/2016/12/05/media/fake-news-real-violence-pizzagate/index.html.   
 45. Daniela C. Manzi, Managing the Misinformation Marketplace: The First Amendment and the 
Fight Against Fake News, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 2623 (2019).   
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inciting followers to lawlessness.  Stated differently, these theories have a 
demonstrated propensity to cause violent conduct.  (3) The speech is 
primarily disseminated in online fora.  As several commentators have noted, 
the internet has profoundly changed the ways in which people 
communicate.46  While technological advances have historically raised a 
broad spectrum of First Amendment concerns, the free speech considerations 
regarding online conspiracy speech are particularly acute.  Taken together, 
these criteria inform the proposed judicial solution presented in Part VI. 
III.     DOCTRINAL HISTORY 
Conspiracy speech of the type conducted by QAnon and Pizzagate 
followers implicates two distinct realms of First Amendment doctrine: (1) 
unlawful advocacy and (2) false speech.  Part A examines the historical 
evolution of the unlawful advocacy doctrine, including a close examination 
of the modern standard set forth in Brandenburg v. Ohio.47  Part B focuses 
on recent developments in False Speech jurisprudence, notably the Supreme 
Court’s decision in United States v. Alvarez.48 
A. UNLAWFUL ADVOCACY 
The First Amendment limits the government’s ability to pass laws 
abridging the freedom of speech and expression.49  While the right to 
unfettered speech is not absolute, it is commonly understood to receive broad 
protection in both courts of law and courts of public opinion.  Although the 
First Amendment has assumed a supreme place within our hierarchy of 
constitutional values, free speech doctrine only began receiving significant 
judicial treatment about one hundred years ago.50  Throughout the past 
century, many theoretic assumptions that underlie the free speech doctrine 
have become canonical.  These philosophical underpinnings–including the 
“marketplace of ideas”51 and the democratic necessity of a well-informed 
polity–will be explored in greater detail in Part IV.   
 
 46. See Mark Tushnet, Internet Exceptionalism: An Overview from General Constitutional Law, 56 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1637 (2015); See also Alan K. Chen, Free Speech and the Confluence of National 
Security and Internet Exceptionalism, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 379 (2017).   
 47. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 48. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012).   
 49. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 50. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503 (1951) (plurality opinion) (“No important case 
involving free speech was decided by this Court prior to Schenck v. United States [in 1919].”). 
 51. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“But when men 
have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they 
believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free 
trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried 
out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.”). 
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One of the earliest First Amendment issues the Supreme Court decided 
involved the unlawful advocacy of violence.  Although the government had 
historically enacted repressive speech legislation—particularly during 
periods of national emergency—its constitutional ability to do so avoided 
Supreme Court scrutiny until World War I.52  In Schenk v. United States, the 
Court was tasked with deciding whether the Espionage Act of 1917, which 
proscribed certain forms of “otherwise protected speech,” ran afoul of 
Constitutional guarantees.53  The Defendant Charles Schenck, a member of 
the U.S. Socialist Party, had been charged with distributing leaflets declaring 
that the civilian draft violated the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition 
against involuntary servitude.54  While the leaflets did not call for violent 
action, they were said to obstruct military recruitment and advocate general 
insubordination.55  In a unanimous opinion authored by Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, the Court held that the key question in unlawful advocacy cases was 
whether “the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a 
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the 
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.”56  Justice Holmes 
clarified this standard, famously stating that First Amendment protection did 
not extend to speakers who falsely shouting “fire” in a crowded theater.57  
While the “clear and present danger” test appeared, on its face, to grant 
extensive protection to unlawful advocacy, in practice it was hardly an 
onerous standard.  Not only did the Court uphold Schenck’s conviction, it 
extended the “clear and present danger” analysis to uphold numerous 
prosecutions under the Espionage Act 1917 and Sedition Act of 1918.58   
In the intervening years, the Court’s treatment of unlawful advocacy 
has fluctuated.  Deference for government suppression reached its high 
watermark in Gitlow v. New York, where the Court upheld a New York law 
proscribing “Advocacy of Criminal Anarchy.”59  The statute’s provisions 
were general—they did not require that defendants (1) call for definite or 
immediate acts of force, violence or unlawfulness; (2) use language 
reasonably and ordinarily calculated to incite certain persons to act of force, 
violence, or unlawfulness, or (3) direct violence at a specific person.60  
Despite these broad parameters, the Court adopted a prophylactic rationale, 
incanting ominously that “[a] single revolutionary spark may kindle a fire 
that, smoldering for a time, may burst into a sweeping and destructive 
 
 52. DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 66 (4th ed. 2014). 
 53. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
 54. Id. at 50–51.   
 55. Id. at 49.   
 56. Id. at 52 (emphasis added).   
 57. Id.   
 58. FARBER, supra note 52, at 66–67.   
 59. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925).   
 60. Id. at 665–66.   
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conflagration.”61  This “bad tendency” analysis remained in vogue until after 
World War II.62  Reversing course in Terminiello v. Chicago, the Court 
applied a reinvigorated “clear and present danger” test to overturn a breach 
of speech conviction.63  Justice Douglas’ opinion clarified that the clear and 
present danger of a substantive evil must rise far above “public 
inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.”64 
Broad First Amendment protection would not last long, however. In 
lockstep with McCarthyism, the Court’s decision in Dennis v. United States 
again recalibrated the “clear and present danger” test toward government 
suppression.65  Writing for the plurality, Chief Justice Vinson reimagined the 
standard as a simple balancing test.  Finding the gravity of the evil—in this 
case, violent overthrow of the United States government—insufficiently 
discounted by the improbability that such overthrow would occur, the Court 
upheld Dennis’ conviction under the Smith Act.66  As in Gitlow, the Dennis 
Court sanctioned the government’s capacity to take preventive measures.  “If 
the ingredients of reaction are present,” Vincent wrote, “we cannot bind the 
Government to wait until the catalyst is added.”67 
The Court’s current stance regarding unlawful advocacy was set forth 
in Brandenburg v. Ohio.68  There, the Court considered the prosecution of a 
local Ku Klux Klan leader under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute for 
promoting violence as a means of political reform.69  During a Klan rally 
held in Hamilton County, Ohio, Clarence Brandenburg gave a speech calling 
for “revengeance” on the federal government should they continue to 
“suppress the…Caucasian Race.”70  The rally was later broadcast on local 
and national networks.71  In reversing the conviction, the Court eschewed the 
“clear and present danger” test in favor of a much broader First Amendment 
protection for criminal incitement.  The per curiam opinion established the 
contemporary standard for unlawful advocacy as: the constitutional 
guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or 
proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such 
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is 
likely to incite or produce such action.72  Importantly, the Court distinguished 
between “the mere abstract teaching of the…moral necessity for a resort to 
 
 61. Id. at 669. 
 62. FARBER, supra note 52, at 70.   
 63. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949). 
 64. Id. at 5.   
 65. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).   
 66. Id. at 510, 516–17.   
 67. Id. at 511.   
 68. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 69. Id. at 444–45. 
 70. Id. at 446.   
 71. Id. at 445.   
 72. Id. at 447. 
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force and violence” and “preparing a group for violent action and steeling it 
to such action.”73  Under this standard, violent advocacy is protected under 
the First Amendment absent a contextual showing of imminent harm.  The 
Brandenburg test has turned out to be highly speech-protective in subsequent 
cases.74   
Before moving to False Speech, it is important to quickly examine the 
policy considerations which underlie unlawful advocacy doctrine. Although 
protection for criminal incitement has oscillated throughout the prior 
century—oftentimes reflecting broader sociopolitical contexts—the entire 
jurisprudence reveals an ongoing attempt to balance two fundamental 
concerns.  On the one hand, the Court has sought to provide expressive room 
for political minorities to voice ideological dissent, even dissent that 
promotes violent upheaval and profound normative change.  On the other, 
the Court has attempted to protect the citizenry from legitimate threats, 
particularly during times of war or heightened national security.  Such 
balancing is reflected in each iteration of incitement jurisprudence, from the 
“clear and present danger” test to Brandenburg’s contemporary standard.  
Moreover, unlawful advocacy doctrine has evaded the Court’s standard two-
tiered categorization, existing somewhere between the unprotected low-
value speech of obscenity and fighting words, and pure political speech 
ensured full constitutional safeguard.75  As it currently stands, the 
jurisprudence is skewed heavily toward speech-protection.  This preference 
mirrors the presiding liberal First Amendment regime that favors more 
speech as opposed to less.  Inherent within the prevailing dogma is the 
concept of the “marketplace of ideas.”  First articulated by Justice Holmes’ 
dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States, the “marketplace of ideas” 
essentially posits that, in the arena of public expression, valuable ideas 
ultimately will ultimately eliminate harmful ones.76  Thus, the “marketplace 
of ideas” fundamentally resists government censorship, even censorship of 
dangerous or hateful expression.  Instead, speech regulation is left to the 
democratic masses.  While the “marketplace of ideas” will be examined in 
greater detail in Part IV, for now it suffices to say that Brandenburg’s narrow 
authorization for government intervention can be justified as a market 
failure.  Central to Brandenburg’s holding is the imminence requirement.  
Indeed, the lawless action called for by the inciting speech must be on the 
verge of happening.  In this context, counterspeech may not successfully 
diminish the incendiary potential of dangerous expression.  Absent normal 
temporal conditions, the market fails and the harmful idea wins out. 
 
 73. Id. at 448.   
 74. Martin H. Redish & Matthew Fisher, Terrorizing Advocacy and the First Amendment: Free 
Expression and the Fallacy of Mutual Exclusivity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 565, 568 (2017).   
 75. Alan K. Chen, Free Speech and the Confluence of National Security and Internet 
Exceptionalism, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 379, 386 (2017).   
 76. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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B. FALSE SPEECH 
While the parameters of unlawful advocacy protection have been 
largely settled over the last one hundred years, the doctrinal history 
surrounding false speech is far less clear.  Rather, than carving out a cohesive 
sphere within First Amendment law, false speech doctrine has emerged from 
disparate corners of the jurisprudence.  It is evident, however, that the Court 
has harbored some level of suspicion for false statements since the onset of 
First Amendment jurisprudence.  Indeed, Holmes’ crowded theater example 
incorporates falseness as a central factor in defining unprotected speech.77  
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. is even more clear.78 There, the Court claimed 
that “[t]here is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.”79  Rather, 
such statements “are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any 
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social 
interest in order and morality.”80  The Court has followed this reasoning in 
several contexts, limiting speech protection in cases of fraud,81 perjury,82 
false commercial speech,83 and, as in Gertz, defamation.84   
Yet, the Court has at other times provided some degree of protection to 
false statements.  Usually, such falsehoods are tolerated to ensure a 
functioning marketplace of ideas.  Thus, the “Breathing Space” rationale 
articulated in New York Times v Sullivan protects erroneous statements when 
necessary to avoid chilling free and robust debate.85   
The Court most recently addressed false speech in United States v. 
Alvarez.86  In that case, Xavier Alvarez was prosecuted under the Stolen 
Valor Act for dishonestly claiming to have received a congressional medal 
of honor.87  The Act in question provided criminal sanctions for anyone who 
“falsely represents himself or herself, verbally or in writing, to have been 
awarded any decoration or medal authorized by Congress for the Armed 
Forces of the United States.”88  A fractured court struck down the Stolen 
Valor Act as a content-based restriction.89  Central to the holding was the 
Act’s failure to tie false speech to some tangible or legally-cognizable 
 
 77. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“The most stringent protection of free speech 
would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.”) (emphasis added).   
 78. Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
 79. Id. at 340.   
 80. Id. 
 81. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 
(1976). 
 82. United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 97 (1993). 
 83. Virginia Bd., 425 U.S. at 771.   
 84. Gertz v. Robert Welsh, 418 U.S. 323, 340.   
 85. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964). 
 86. 567 U.S. 709 (2012).   
 87. Id. at 713. 
 88. Id. at 716.   
 89. Id. at 729–30.   
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harm.90  Writing for the plurality, Justice Kennedy clarified, that “falsity 
alone may not suffice to bring the speech outside the First Amendment.”91   
Less clear, however, is the appropriate standard of review to be applied 
in false speech cases.  The plurality found Alvarez’s statements to be fully 
protected speech, and thus struck the Stolen Valor Act under “exacting” 
scrutiny.92  Justice Breyer’s concurrence, on the other hand, distinguished 
between false statements regarding “philosophy, religion, history, the social 
sciences, [and] the arts” and statements that do not implicate these higher 
values.93  In Breyer’s conception, laws targeting the former should be 
analyzed under strict scrutiny whereas laws concerning “false statements of 
easily verifiable facts that do not concern such subject matter”94 should 
receive lesser protection.  Because Alvarez’ statements fell within the latter 
category, Breyer concluded that the Court should have subjected the Act to 
an intermediate scrutiny standard.95   
Although the jurisprudence is far from a model of clarity, there are some 
general observations we can make about false speech doctrine.  First, despite 
repeatedly categorizing untrue statements as constitutionally valueless, it is 
clear the Court affords false speech some level of First Amendment 
protection.  Second, the level of protection seems roughly correlated to the 
speech’s capacity to produce social value.  As the breathing space concept 
makes clear, false statements are sometimes intermingled with the 
expression of true ideas.  Envisioned as a sort of expressive curtilage, 
breathing space recognizes the ability of erroneous statements to insulate 
high-value ideas from constitutional chill.  Closely related is the truth-
seeking function of the marketplace of ideas.  In this context, even false 
speech makes a valuable contribution to public debate by serving as an 
illuminating foil to true ideas and cherished values.  As false statements are 
conquered in the arena of public expression, the rationale holds, we come to 
a sharper understanding of the truth.  Moreover, false speech may be valuable 
in various social settings, such as safeguarding individual privacy, shielding 
minority groups from prejudice, and diffusing tense or dangerous 
situations.96  In these circumstances, false speech can actually produce more 
social utility than true statements. On the other hand, false speech protection 
is discounted when the speech causes concrete and tangible harms.  While 
made explicit in Alvarez, the Court has voiced this preference in a variety of 
contexts.  Again, cases involving fraud, defamation, and government 
impersonation are illustrative.   
 
 90. Id. at 719.   
 91. Id.   
 92. Id. at 724.   
 93. Id. at 731–32 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 94. Id. at 732.   
 95. Id.   
 96. Id.   
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IV.     CONSPIRACY SPEECH ISSUES UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
With this jurisprudence in mind, we can begin to analyze how these 
conspiracies interact with existing free speech doctrine.  Part A will explore 
the areas where conspiracy speech evades First Amendment categorization.  
Part B will provide an in-depth analysis of the marketplace of ideas and 
articulate why online conspiracies such as QAnon and Pizzagate often lead 
to market failure.   
A. DOCTRINAL PROBLEMS 
1. Unlawful Advocacy 
A cursory analysis demonstrates that modern First Amendment doctrine 
is ill-suited to confront emerging challenges posed by QAnon and Pizzagate.  
The issue is primarily one of categorization.  Conspiracy speech of the type 
imagined here does not conscribe neatly to unlawful advocacy or false 
speech jurisprudence.  As courts attempt to assess injuries caused by QAnon 
and Pizzagate, they will be forced to assign the speech to either category.  
This type of doctrinal sorting implicates two basic problems.  The first is 
substantive.  Conspiracy speech includes elements of unprotected speech 
under both criminal incitement and false speech standards, but is left 
unregulated by either.  The second is formal.  Existing doctrine is ill-
equipped to address the means by which the speech is disseminated.  
Specifically, the legal standards fail to account for the transformative quality 
of the internet.  While our methods of communication have fundamentally 
changed, much speech doctrine has remained static.  The likely result will be 
that conspiracy speech will receive protection and that injuries it causes will 
be left unredressed.  This has less to do with the value produced by 
conspiracy speech and more with outmoded legal standards.97   
Beginning with unlawful advocacy, Brandenburg prohibits the 
government from regulating criminal incitement absent a highly speech-
deferential showing.  To meet this standard, the state must demonstrate that 
(1) the speaker intended to incite imminent lawless action; (2) the speech is 
likely be successful in its incitement of unlawful action in the specific 
context; and (3) the illegal action must be likely, under these circumstances, 
to be imminent.98  This reveals a disconnect between the law on the books 
and conspiracy speech in practice.  Starting with the first prong, the degree 
to which conspiracy theories like QAnon and Pizzagate actually call for 
lawless action is questionable.  While there is a documented causal link 
 
 97. In the realm of cyberterrorism, Martin Redish & Matthew Fisher have deemed this the fallacy of 
mutual exclusivity.  Because cyberterrorism contains elements of both unlawful advocacy and true 
threats, it should be analyzed under its own legal framework rather than pigeonholed into one or the other.  
Redish & Fisher, supra note 74. 
 98. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
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between these conspiracies and violent crimes,99 the actual speech may 
operate by insinuation rather than explicit advocacy of action.  Common 
among conspiracy theory message boards are vague appeals to vigilantism 
and abstract calls to “take back our country.”100  Moreover, the Storm 
narrative, while manifestly violent, seems to hold that some combination of 
the military and ex-President Trump will expose the purported cabal.101  Put 
another way, the responsibility for action does not fall upon the average Q 
follower.  Thus, conspiracy speech circulating online may be more likely to 
inspire lawless action than directly call for it.  Unlike classic incitement or 
cyber terrorism, which predicates its ideological teachings and recruitment 
upon political revolution, conspiracy speech seems to operate by way of 
distortion.  It is the representation of conspiracy as objective fact, the 
commingling of fiction and reality, that appears to catalyze followers to 
violence.102  It is therefore unsurprising that criminal defendants linked to 
both Pizzagate and QAnon claim to have been inspired by child safety 
concerns.103  Believing their targets to be involved in child sex trafficking, 
action became a moral imperative.104  How the First Amendment addresses 
this distortive quality is an open question. 
The intent requirement poses additional problems.  While intentionality 
should remain a prerequisite in any speech prohibition, the issue is 
complicated in online conspiracy speech by questions of identity and 
motivation.  Regarding the former, it is unclear whether liability should fall 
upon the online speaker or the moderator who runs the forum.  Common 
sense, as well as principles of individual autonomy, seem to indicate that the 
speaker should be held responsible.  But the issue is not as straightforward 
as it first appears.  Online moderators create the environment in which the 
dangerous speech proliferates.  As touched upon later, it may not be a single, 
identifiable utterance that provokes lawlessness, but a critical mass of similar 
utterances by separate speakers over time.  Whereas in prior decades, the 
inciting speaker may have also organized the hostile environment, in 
conspiracy speech the roles are often bifurcated.  The question then becomes 
liability falls on the powder keg or the match.   
Similarly, conspiracy speakers may have diverse motives when actually 
speaking.  To illustrate this point simply, I will draw a distinction between 
two groups I label Disrupters and True Believers.  Disrupters—comprised 
mostly of political operators, internet trolls, and media personalities—will 
 
 99. Beckett, supra note 19.   
 100. Roose, supra note 6. 
 101. Id.   
 102. LaFrance, supra note 35.   
 103. Id.   
 104. Several of these individuals were parents themselves.  Beckett, supra note 19.   
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engage in conspiracy speech to further certain agendas.105  For example, alt-
right activists disseminated the Pizzagate theory as a means of tarnishing and 
delegitimizing the Clinton campaign.106  Often times, Disrupters will partake 
in such speech with the active intention to create confusion about particular 
subjects and distort the worldviews of others.107  It does not matter whether 
they actually find such speech veritable so long as it can be instrumentalized 
toward certain ends.  In contrast, True Believers genuinely understand such 
conspiracies to reflect objective reality.108 They engage in conspiracy speech 
to spread awareness about the actual state of things.  Does this distinction 
matter for the purpose of First Amendment liability and should it?  The 
exploitative quality of Disrupter speech appears to lend itself to greater 
culpability.  At the same time, True Believers, by nature of their genuine 
feeling, may come across as more persuasive to active listeners, and 
therefore more effective at inciting violence.  Again, Brandenburg has little 
to say about this distinction.   
Finally, Brandenburg’s imminence prong is ill-fit to address the nature 
of online conspiracy speech.  The imminence requirement is said to prevent 
suppression where the government’s fears of speech’s incendiary potential 
are exaggerated or misguided.  By limiting regulation to speech on the cusp 
of conduct, the imminence prong prevents expressive chill.  But many 
commentators have questioned whether the imminence requirement was 
ever an appropriate consideration in balancing free speech and public safety 
concerns.109  Citing empirical evidence, this critique focuses on the corrosive 
potential of certain speech, arguing that courts have incorrectly prioritized 
immediately dangerous expression over the long-term effects of destructive 
ideologies.110  Put another way, systematic and enduring proselytization into 
a dangerous worldview is more likely to lead the speaker to violent action 
than any single utterance, no matter how fraught the environment in which 
that utterance occurs.  Borrowing from Alexander Tsesis’ scholarship, “[i]t 
is apparent . .. . . that under certain circumstances there will be stepwise 
progression from verbal aggression to violence, from rumor to riot, from 
gossip to genocide.”111  Not only is this reasoning logical, it is particularly 
acute in the context of online conspiracy speech.  The factual medium in 
 
 105. Jeremy W. Peters, A Pro-Trump Conspiracy Theorist, a False Tweet and a Runaway Story, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/10/us/politics/comey-fake-news-twitter-
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 106. Id.   
 107. Id.   
 108. Tommy Beer, Majority of Republicans Believe the QAnon Conspiracy Theory Is Partly or Mostly 
True, Survey Finds, FORBES (Sept. 2, 2020, 6:03 PM), 
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conspiracy-theory-is-partly-or-mostly-true-survey-finds/?sh=505be57e5231.   
 109. Alexander Tsesis, Prohibiting Incitement on the Internet, 7 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 10 (2002). 
 110. Id.   
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which conspiracies are presented is perhaps more likely to shape listeners’ 
worldview over time than ideology.112  What may first strike the reader as 
implausible, may take on the quality of verisimilitude when she is presented 
with greater “evidence.”  The compilation of evidence, in turn, creates a 
pressure cooker effect whereby listeners are inspired to act as their exterior 
realities appears increasingly desperate.113  QAnon demonstrates this effect.  
“Q Drops” are progressive—they are released over a series of months rather 
than unloaded all at once.114  Many such drops build anticipation for future 
events.115  This anticipation transforms into anxiety, stirring followers into a 
frenzy and inciting them to act in the real world.116  Limiting incitement 
doctrine to imminently dangerous expression fails to address these issues.  
Moreover, the online forums do not conform to the temporal realities of the 
era in which Brandenburg was decided.  While message boards certainly 
may resemble an angry mob in some capacities, they may also lack essential 
qualities of a combustible crowd.  Speakers may post–and listeners may 
read–different things at different times. This lack of simultaneous interaction 
makes it difficult to pinpoint exactly when incitement may have occurred.   
2. False Speech 
At first, modern false speech doctrine may seem better equipped to 
address online conspiracy theories.  As noted above, the current 
jurisprudence (1) offers some protection for false speech; (2) protection 
correlates with the speech’s ability to produce value; and (3) value—and thus 
protection—is discounted when the speech also produces concrete harms.117  
Turning to the first criterion, there is an argument to be made that false 
statements of fact—the kind at play in conspiracy speech—receive less 
protection than false ideas.  As both David Han and Frederick Schauer have 
touched upon, “the most notable expositors of the ‘pursuit of truth’ theory of 
free speech—from Mill to John Milton to Oliver Wendell Holmes—were 
primarily concerned with the ideological ‘truth’ produced by the marketplace 
of ideas rather than factual truth.”118  Ideological truth implicates “debatable 
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matters of religious, moral, and political truth-like the merits of Communism 
or the ways in which one should live one’s life-rather than assertions of hard 
fact.”119  While Alvarez makes clear that some false facts do receive 
constitutional protection, perhaps other considerations present in conspiracy 
speech can override that presumption. 
Second, it seems fairly clear that conspiracy speech produces little 
social value.  While one may argue that such conspiracies foster community, 
the toxic nature of those communities decidedly outweighs any marginal 
benefit.  Similarly, the argument that false statements produce clearer 
conceptions of truth has little context here.  Again, this is not a clash of 
ideologies by which we arrive at a higher understanding.  Rather, conspiracy 
speech espouses manifestly false realities, mixing narrative with objectivity.  
The costs associated with dispelling false facts are far greater than any value 
created.120   
Third, the harms produced by conspiracy speech are tremendous.  As 
stated earlier, the proliferation of this speech has been linked directly to 
violent action.  People have been murdered, children kidnapped, and 
Capitols breached all in service of these false narratives.121  There have also 
been steep costs on followers.  Setting aside individuals who have lost liberty 
from criminal sentencing, many followers have lost time, money, and 
familial connection due to their participation in the conspiracies.122  Further, 
followers have experienced psychological harms upon learning that their 
chosen theory was not true.123  At a more abstract level, conspiracy speech 
has a deleterious effect on the democratic process.  The dissemination of 
misinformation interferes with the public’s capacity to make sound, rational 
choices.124  Conspiracies regarding politicians also undermine trust in public 
officials.125  On the flip side, conspiracy speech can be leveraged by self-
interested actors for socio-political gain.126  Abstracting even further, such 
speech can cause one to question the nature of objectivity wholesale.  An 
inability to distinguish between what is real and what is not can have a 
destabilizing effect on individual psyches.   
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Despite this calculus, it is far from certain that courts would prohibit 
conspiracy speech under the current standard.  As Mark Tushnet and other 
commentators have noted, conspiracy speech, while factually false, is often 
“ideologically inflected.”127  This means that the content of conspiracy 
speech—while plainly untrue and socially valueless—is often associated 
with certain ideological values that receive broad First Amendment 
protection.128  For example, QAnon and Pizzagate contain several 
recognizable philosophies.  Their admiration for ex-President Trump and 
deep mistrust of government exhibits libertarian and far-right-wing 
sympathies.129  Their belief in the coming Storm, and the following social 
utopia, conjures evangelical Christianity.130  Finally, their fear of an elite and 
powerful cabal is reminiscent of several conspiracy theories and contains 
deeply anti-Semitic undertones.131  David Han pushes this concept even 
further, arguing that belief in conspiracy theory is itself an ideological 
viewpoint.  In Han’s conception, there is ideological import in the very act 
of taking an anti-establishment stance, in believing that things are not as they 
appear.132  Viewed this way, it is unlikely that courts permit regulation under 
the First Amendment.  In fact, a majority of Justices on the Alvarez Court 
agreed that strict scrutiny should apply to false statements regarding 
“philosophy, religion, history, the social sciences, [and] the arts.”133 If such 
statements include QAnon and Pizzagate conspiracy speech, any legislation 
limiting such speech will likely be struck down.   
B. MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS 
Acknowledging that existing doctrine is ill-suited to confront emerging 
conspiracy speech issues, a different inquiry becomes necessary.  As stated 
above, the modern First Amendment regime is heavily influenced by the 
marketplace of ideas.  Within this marketplace, it is claimed, diverse 
expressions meet, commingle, bastion one another and battle for supremacy.  
Through this dynamic process, the best ideas win out and society arrives at 
the greatest conception of truth.  Because a functioning market filters 
harmful and untrue expression over time, government regulation of speech 
becomes unnecessary.  In fact, the theory posits that suppressing speech—
even harmful speech—is dangerous to the marketplace because (1) 
suppression may chill socially-useful expression; (2) the state may use 
suppressive measures to censor political minorities; and (3) the process by 
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which truthful ideas conquer false ones actually produces more social value 
than had those ideas gone uncontested in the first instance. Thus, the proper 
remedy for harmful speech in normal circumstances is counterspeech.  
Government intervention is only warranted to combat market failures.  
Again, the Brandenburg standard illustrates this concept.  The imminence 
requirement demonstrates that, in certain circumstances, counterspeech 
cannot effectively diffuse incendiary expression.  This failure of persuasion 
means that the harmful idea wins a place in the market it otherwise should 
not have.  In the incitement context, this can lead to social harms such as 
violent action and lawlessness.   
This section will explore how conspiracy speech operates within the 
marketplace of ideas.  My approach is instrumental rather than absolutist.134  
Although conspiracy speech does not fit neatly within unlawful advocacy or 
false speech doctrine, I argue that online conspiracies still trigger the types 
of market failures that contemporary First Amendment law attempts to 
correct.  Because existing doctrine fails to address these market breakdowns, 
we must envision new solutions to confront these emerging problems.   
Although the marketplace of ideas has theoretical origins in the writings 
of John Stuart Mill, John Milton, and James Madison, the conception first 
entered American constitutional jurisprudence in Justice Holmes’ Abrams 
dissent.   
[M]en . . . may come to believe even more than they believe the very 
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better 
reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the 
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth 
is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at 
any rate is the theory of our Constitution.135 
Although briefly described earlier, it is important to spend some time 
identifying the assumptions and commitments behind this theory.136  Again, 
the central thesis is that society reaches the best conception of truth through 
the free trade of ideas in a competitive marketplace.  Not only does 
competition ensure the most socially-valuable ideas will win out, but the 
competitive process reveals why certain ideas are more valuable than others.  
Thus, when harmful expression—such as hate speech, misinformation, and 
violent advocacy—enter the arena, the proper solution is to counter that 
speech with contrary expression.  Relatedly, harmful expression can itself be 
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valuable by serving as a social safety-valve.137  Providing an expressive 
avenue to angry, bigoted, and hateful individuals ensures their frustrations 
do not morph into violent action.  Conversely, allowing all ideas into the 
market safeguards political minorities from repressive ruling blocs.  Read 
together, the marketplace is inherently maximalist; the more speech the 
better. 
With this in mind, it is unsurprising that the marketplace of ideas is 
deeply suspicious of government speech suppression.  Rejecting 
paternalism, proponents of the marketplace prefer that speech regulation 
occur via private ordering.  Ensuring such decisions are made democratically 
prevents the state from censoring unpopular, but potentially valuable, 
opinions, and from prescribing certain orthodoxies upon the community.  
Thus, state intervention is only tolerated to ensure a working marketplace.   
Despite these lofty goals, commentators have questioned whether the 
marketplace functions as advertised.  As an initial matter, the theory ignores 
external factors that may contribute to an idea’s widespread acceptance.  For 
example, a particular theory may achieve supremacy within the marketplace 
because the speaker is politically powerful, has superior access to economic 
resources or communicative channels, or is uniquely persuasive in 
conveying her message.138  These influences may be exercised completely 
independent of the speech’s social or truthful value.  Similarly, the 
marketplace suffers from a majoritarian problem.  It is fairly evident that just 
because some ideas are widely accepted, does not mean that they are the 
most true or most socially beneficial.139  The theory overlooks—or more 
perniciously, accepts—that some ideas become popular primarily because 
they serve the interests of powerful groups.  Worse still, people may assume 
that consensus equates truth, leading to the long-term reproduction and 
survival of harmful expression.  One only need look to the eugenics 
movement of the early 20th century to confirm this.140  Relatedly, continuing 
legacies of white supremacy, gender discrimination, and homo/transphobia 
demonstrate the staying power of toxic ideas.  Despite their odious content, 
the popularity of such expression within the political mainstream likely 
ensures their dominance in a competitive marketplace.  At an abstract level, 
the marketplace can be seen as reproducing many of the problems associated 
with liberalism.  The competitive spirit of the marketplace of ideas reveals 
an inherently capitalist viewpoint.  Less generously, it can be viewed as 
Darwinian.  Marketplace backers argue that, despite these pitfalls, the 
unfettered trade in ideas is still superior to government paternalism.141  
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However, international law comparisons demonstrate that these paternalist 
fears may be unfounded.142   
More narrowly, some commentators believe that the marketplace theory 
was never meant to correct the type of misinformation disseminated by 
conspiracy theorists.  Rather, the theoretical marketplace was conceived to 
address debatable matters of ideology, not issues of demonstrable and 
verifiable fact.143  Indeed, nascent free speech doctrine of the first half of the 
twentieth century was primarily concerned with advocacy and not 
description.144  It is possible that this doctrinal tradition implied that the 
power of the marketplace of ideas to select for truth was as applicable to 
factual as it is to religious, ideological, political, and social truth.  But such 
concerns were never addressed explicitly.  Thus, these scholars concede the 
marketplace’s efficacy in the ideological realm, but question its applicability 
to questions of objective fact.145 
Despite these critiques, the marketplace of ideas has achieved a 
hegemonic status within modern First Amendment law.  Ironically, the 
marketplace evidences its own functionality—the theory has won broad 
acceptance against competing ideologies over time.  As the critical path is 
well-trodden, and because courts are unlikely to abandon the philosophy any 
time soon, my argument for regulating conspiracy speech operates within 
current jurisprudential parameters.  Specifically, online conspiracy speech 
implicates several market failures that should be doctrinally and statutorily 
addressed.   
First, a functioning marketplace presumes that expression serves as a 
social safety valve.  Harmful speech is preferable to harmful action, so we 
allow negative expression to assuage whatever psychic tension the speaker 
might be feeling.  In the context of QAnon, we tolerate the spread of 
conspiracy theory—such as the political elite running a child sex-trafficking 
ring—so that the speakers do not target individuals with violent action.  As 
noted earlier, this rationale has not held in practice.146  Several violent crimes 
have been directly or partially inspired by conspiracy speech.  Moreover, if 
the Capitol Riots are any indication, conspiracy-inspired criminality has 
become more prolific and incendiary as speech has proliferated.  What 
causes this market failure?   
The answer likely has to do with the online format in which speech is 
disseminated.  Mark Tushnet and other commentators have discussed the 
concept of internet exceptionalism, which argues that the sui generis nature 
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of online speech justifies greater speech regulation.147  These scholars point 
to three criteria: (1) Amplification—online speech can be communicated 
broadly and instantaneously; (2) Cost—online communication is much less 
expensive than traditional modes of speech; and (3) Anonymity—not only 
can individuals mask their real-world identities when participating in online 
speech, they can concoct entirely new personas.148  This allows online 
speakers to act without inhibition, engaging in behaviors and performing 
fantasies that might otherwise bring them social opprobrium.  While internet 
exceptionalism is true of any online expression, the characteristics identified 
are especially volatile in the context of conspiracy speech.  In particular, the 
propensity of online speech to proliferate quickly tests the limits of the safety 
valve theory.  This is because the safety valve theory assumes a cooling 
period—the rationale only holds if negative expression is released into a 
neutral environment.  When, however, that expression is met instantaneously 
with agreement or increasingly hostile versions of the same sentiment, the 
effect is cumulative rather than dissipative.  Not only that, some online 
communities prioritize particularly virulent forms of speech, and may 
actually reward the most provocative content with increased distribution.149  
This phenomenon, along with the anonymous nature of online expression, 
results is destructive echo chambers, whereby negative speech and emotion 
continuously intensifies.150  As Cass Sunstein has noted, this effect “can 
dramatically amplify the capacity of speech in one place to cause violence 
elsewhere at some uncertain time…”151  The safety valve rationale is thus 
turned on its head.  Rather than assuaging psychic tensions, harmful speech 
combines, proliferates and transmutes into violent action.   
A second market failure is the absence of counterspeech.  Again, a 
functioning marketplace presumes interaction, whereby certain harmful 
ideas will be criticized, counterpoised, and revealed as erroneous by more 
valuable forms of expression.  Without counterspeech, the market fails to run 
efficiently and harmful expression takes hold.  In the context of conspiracy 
speech, both empirical data and personal accounts reveal that conspiracy 
message boards operate more as an echo chamber than as an open 
marketplace.152  This phenomenon exists on multiple levels.  As an initial 
matter, internet fora are often segregated by interest, attracting individuals 
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predisposed to likeminded ideologies.153  In this sense, online congregation 
more closely replicates members-only meetings than public squares.  Of 
course, this is true of many online—and even offline—gathering places, not 
just hubs for conspiracy speech.  Unpopular speech is often first-expressed 
behind closed doors.  Ideologies may develop in private, bastioned internally 
by assenting voices, before they are revealed to the public and tested in the 
marketplace. This is common in both contemporary right-wing groups and 
the Marxist collectives of yesteryear.  Indeed, this interest-specialization has 
also taken hold in society more generally.  The advent of partisan news media 
delivers politically-curated content and ensures that individuals are less-
likely to be exposed to dissenting opinions.154  Social media algorithms, 
moreover, track users’ search history and tend to reproduce preexisting ideas 
and biases.155  In sum, counterspeech exposure is dwindling and the 
continued efficacy of rationale is becoming increasingly nebulous. 
There is reason to believe, however, that the absence of counterspeech 
is particularly acute in online message boards where conspiracies proliferate.  
Much of this can be attributed to community norms and standards.  In the 
context of QAnon, online moderators have played a key role in not only 
determining which speech matters, but also who is allowed to speak.156  This 
has resulted in membership purges when individuals fail to pass an 
ideological purity test.  For example, moderators of a significant QAnon 
message board began banning users who failed to “keep the faith” after 
President Biden’s inauguration.157  The capacity to remove dissenting voices 
from online message boards renders counterspeech a lofty goal rather than a 
market default.158   
Relatedly, moderators wield significant influence in determining which 
posts are valuable within particular communities.159  This taste-making 
function distributes cache to certain speakers who best meet a particular set 
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of standards.  Often times, value is assigned to posts that closely reproduce 
the moderators’ viewpoint in the most incendiary way.160  This results in a 
grooming effect—speakers are incentivized toward ideological assent as a 
means of social recognition.161  This incentive structure may be particularly 
tantalizing for individuals who are outcast or exiled in more traditional 
communities.  Moreover, the reward for valued speech is often increased 
exposure.162  This serves a dual function.  The incendiary message not only 
reaches wider audiences, but also signals to other members what valuable 
speech looks like.  All this serves to reproduce particular viewpoints and shut 
out counterspeech.   
Finally, particular demographic attributes present in online conspiracy 
communities may further reduce the efficacy of counterspeech.  One such 
example is the tendency of conspiracy followers to withdraw from other 
speech venues.163  As stated earlier, community incentive structures may 
appeal to individuals that typically operate outside of conventional social 
networks or suffer from mental illness.164  Thus, loners, social outcasts, and 
the mentally-ill may find homes within these communities that they lack 
elsewhere.  This predatory baiting is a particularly pernicious aspect of 
online conspiracy fora.  Beyond that, however, conspiracy speech seems 
especially adept at conscripting individuals from other networks into the 
conspiracy community.  Put another way, followers choose to associate with 
fellow conspiracy theorists over traditional relations such as friends and 
family.165  Countless personal accounts document this phenomenon—
someone’s parent or child becomes increasingly withdrawn, in contact less-
frequently, only willing to engage in certain subject matter discourse.166  In 
this sense, conspiracy forums become the predominant, if not exclusive, 
speech venue in which these persons participate.  What is less clear is why 
this tends to happen.  One reason could be that conspiracy speech’s objective 
garb tends to persuade followers that they have uncovered an unfettered 
reality.  Operating under this assumption, these individuals may prefer 
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discourse with the similarly “enlightened.”  Relatedly, a unifying 
characteristic among conspiracy speakers seems to be a severe distrust of 
institutional authority.167  This may render followers less likely to seek 
information from sources outside the conspiracy community.  Another factor 
could be that progressive “information” reveals, such as Q drops, are 
psychologically stimulating.168  Because Q could release a bombshell at any 
time, followers may choose conspiracy speech over more quotidian realities.  
A fourth reason may have to do with membership stigma.  Conspiracy 
followers may be renounced or disclaimed by traditional network ties for 
participation in such speech, leaving online message boards as their only 
viable communities.169  Finally, the COVID-19 pandemic, which foreclosed 
many traditional speech venues, may well have exacerbated these 
problems.170  Again, these suggestions are not backed by detailed empirical 
research and thus form only individual or speculative accounts.  It seems 
evident, however, that these qualities make counterspeech less viable in this 
context. 
V. EXISTING SCHOLARSHIP 
Because online conspiracy speech is an emerging phenomenon, there 
has been little academic treatment of the subject directly.  That being said, 
commentators have produced scholarship in adjacent fields—such as cyber 
terrorism and hate speech—that ostensibly address the issues caused by 
harmful online expression.  These solutions can be roughly categorized into 
two groups: (1) Judicial and (2) Legislative.  This section provides a 
topography of recent scholarship and identifies the edifying strengths and 
potential pitfalls of each.   
A. JUDICIAL SOLUTIONS 
1. Overrule Brandenburg 
The most far-reaching judicial solutions call for the wholesale 
abandonment of Brandenburg and its progeny.  These scholars presume that 
Brandenburg has either outlasted its relevance or was incorrectly decided in 
the first instance.171  Regarding the former, some commentators believe 
Brandenburg to be stuck in the past.  Conceptualizing the standard in 
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instrumental terms, they argue that Brandenburg should be understood as a 
pragmatic doctrine reflecting “technological and social conditions of its 
time—one that may grow obsolete as those conditions shift.”172  Specifically, 
they point to changing technological circumstances as fundamentally 
altering the policy balance originally struck by the Brandenburg court.173  In 
1969, when Brandenburg was decided, harmful expression was primarily 
disseminated physically via forms like pamphlets, leaflets, in-person 
meetings, and public gatherings.174  The physical medium imposed both 
economic and temporal costs on speakers, severely limiting their capacity to 
reach mass audiences instantaneously.  In particular, fringe groups were 
likely to lack the material and structural resources necessary to realize a 
mainstream platform.  In this context, limiting government regulation to 
circumstances where unlawful advocacy is directed toward inciting, and 
likely to produce, imminent lawless action seemed an appropriate balance.  
Today, by contrast, speech is “disseminated widely and cheaply via the 
internet and channeled through social media.”175  This novel format allows 
for groups to proliferate and expand beyond anything the Brandenburg Court 
could have conceived.  Put simply, the propensity for speech to incite 
violence has increased exponentially while the government’s power to 
regulate has remained stagnant.  As a result, tragic events such as the Pulse 
nightclub shooting,176 the Boston Marathon bombings,177 and the El Paso 
shootings178 have all been directly linked to online terrorist advocacy.  
Although such speech has catalyzed very tangible harms, it is considered 
“abstract”—and thus protected—under prevailing First Amendment 
doctrine.  Understanding the internet to have irrevocably moved the goal 
posts, these scholars argue that Brandenburg should be recalibrated to 
address modern concerns.179 
More drastically, some commentators believe that Brandenburg 
severely underestimated the dangers of harmful expression in the first 
instance.  In particular, these scholars argue that Brandenburg’s imminence 
requirement fails to accurately characterize the process by which advocacy 
befalls violence.180  As touched upon earlier, ideologically-motivated violent 
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crimes are not committed in a vacuum.  Rather, they seem to result from 
prolonged exposure to harmful expression, whereby one’s worldview is 
oriented increasingly toward hostile ideologies.  As Alexander Tsesis notes, 
“[a]ngry words, spoken in the heat of the moment, may result in violence.  
But the entrenchment of outgroup hatred in an entire culture takes time and 
has far more impact than spontaneous aggression.”181  Again, this is hardly 
farfetched.  Some of the worst human rights atrocities have been preceded 
by virulent and dehumanizing propaganda campaigns.  Speech of this nature 
stokes preexisting biases and blames certain disfavored groups for social ills.  
When this speech is repeated, speakers and listeners are desensitized to the 
violence of its content.  Thus, “[t]here is a close, and virtually necessary, 
connection between advocacy, preparation, coordination, infrastructure 
development, training, indoctrination, desensitization, discrimination, 
singular violent acts, and systematic oppression.”182  By proscribing 
regulation save imminently lawless expression, these commentators argue 
that Brandenburg treats the symptoms and not the illness.   
Central to these critiques is the idea that the First Amendment has 
achieved hegemonic status within the hierarchy of constitutional values—so 
much so that free speech is not simply prioritized over other amendments, 
but is elevated over intrinsic human rights such as dignity and safety from 
bodily harm.  Commentators question whether this arrangement is an 
appropriate reflection of social priorities.183  While such notions may first 
appear sacrilegious, viewed outside our hegemonic context they are not 
unpersuasive.  Should we seriously be in the business of protecting 
expression to the point of real and tangible harms?  As Justice Jackson stated, 
“[t]he Constitution is not a suicide pact.”184  Is, for example, speech that 
falsely denounces the Sandy Hook massacre as a hoax worth the trauma 
inflicted on survivors and family members?185  Should we continue to 
legitimize cross burnings in the yards of Black families?186  These questions 
implicate our deepest values and will likely yield difficult answers.  In 
theorizing solutions, these scholars often look toward European nations as 
reference points, indicating that democratic societies frequently regulate 
harmful speech without invoking the specter of authoritarian censorship.187  
Viewed comparatively, such doctrinal change is not beyond imagination.   
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The clear pitfall of such critiques, however, is that absent philosophical 
sea change, it is unlikely the Court will be willing to accept such reforms.  
As mentioned previously, the prevailing liberal speech regime prefers more 
speech to regulation.  In fields as broad as incitement or hate speech, 
arguments favoring more restrictive standards will likely be met with severe 
resistance.  Again, this reticence is likely to be amplified in the First 
Amendment context because of its place within our constitutional design.   
2. Maintain Brandenburg 
On the other hand, many commentators feel that current First 
Amendment doctrine strikes the appropriate balance between speech and 
regulation.  Taking a deontological perspective, they argue that Brandenburg 
correctly reflects certain essential values necessary to any meaningful free 
speech regime.188  In this sense, the standard for government regulation exists 
at a fixed point—it is not something to be recalibrated with changing 
circumstances.189  These scholars point to the myriad technological advances 
that took place in the 20th century and will continue into the 21st.190  Because 
society has survived since Brandenburg with little jurisprudential 
adjustment, it makes little sense to abandon course.  Further, tailoring First 
Amendment law each and every technological advancement would result in 
doctrinal incoherence.   
More persuasively, these scholars rightfully recognize that exaggerated 
national security concerns have often resulted in restrictions on individual 
freedoms.191  In this sense, the present fear of cyber terrorism—or online 
conspiracy speech—is little different than the specter of Communism in the 
early 20th century.192  Knowing that periods like the Red Scare or 
McCarthyism are now considered indelible stains on our constitutional 
democracy, we can choose to resist modern temptations to suppress rather 
than regress into familiar pitfalls.  These dangers are especially stark against 
the backdrops of power and identity.  Suppression tends to affect 
marginalized and disempowered groups more saliently than those in the 
mainstream.193  First, this brand of ideological repression masks more 
pernicious biases such as ethnonationalism and race hatred.  Second, affected 
groups—due to lack of resources, liminal legal status, and social disfavor—
are less able to combat suppressive measures.  Considered together, the 
dangers in regulating speech will always far outweigh the dangers of some 
abstract threat at some abstract time.   
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While this perspective has admirable and edifying strengths, its 
approach underestimates the transformative quality of the internet.  
Television and radio were certainly extraordinary communicative 
interventions, but they lack the interactive capacity of online speech.  As 
stated earlier, the internet reimagines temporal barriers, speaker/audience 
dichotomies, and public forums.  These attributes make it possible for speech 
to proliferate, persuade, and shape sensibilities in ways never before 
imagined.  Ignoring these fundamental changes—or pretending they are 
substantively indistinguishable from prior technological innovations—is a 
poor way to meet emerging constitutional challenges.  Further, the internet 
tends to both alter and exacerbate the relational concerns identified in the 
previous paragraph.  As scholars have noted, hate speech and ethnocentric 
advocacy have found comfortable homes in the online forum.194  Such 
speech has demonstrable links to violent action.195   
B. LEGISLATIVE 
Commentators have also proposed solutions beyond adjusting the black 
letter law.  Most notoriously, in the realm of cyberterrorism, Eric Posner 
suggested a statute that would criminalize “accessing websites that glorify, 
express support for, or provide encouragement for ISIS” or “ISIS 
recruitment.”196 Other provisions would outlaw distributing links to those 
websites, or even disseminating website content such as text, videos, or 
images.197  Obviously, existing doctrine would also have to change 
considerably for this law to be upheld as constitutional.  Still, this proposal 
represents the draconian measures some scholars are willing to take to 
combat online incitement. 
On the false speech side, one commentator proposed establishing a 
licensing regime for journalists.198  Like other professional industries—such 
as the legal and medical fields—a strict licensing scheme would subject 
journalists to a rigorous set of occupational and ethical standards.199  In 
particular, professional membership would be predicated upon increased 
public responsibility, whereby journalists take on a fiduciary role in 
“guard[ing] [the] democratic discourse.”200  This scheme would be enforced 
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by statutory discipline, professional ethics committees, and continuing 
education requirements.201 
While these ideas represent novel and ambitious solutions to emerging 
free speech problems, both contain critical flaws. As mentioned above, 
Posner’s suggestion is unworkable absent dramatic doctrinal overhaul.  In 
fact, his suggestion would require far greater constitutional transformation 
than a mere recalibration of Brandenburg—enacting such a statute would 
entail reimagining our First Amendment regime wholesale.  Courts are 
therefore unlikely to acquiesce no matter how compelling the countervailing 
interest.  Beyond its unworkability, though, the proposed statute implicates 
a slew of policy concerns.  First, the provisions are obviously draconian, 
providing criminal sanctions for actions as innocuous as sharing links or 
relaying website content.  While there are statutory carve-outs for 
journalistic and research purposes, speakers engaged in what is currently 
considered “pure advocacy” would undoubtedly be subject to prosecution.  
Further, a robust intent requirement would be necessary to prevent over-
policing and criminalizing accidental disseminations.  Second, the statue is 
acutely content-based, solely criminalizing speech related to a single terrorist 
group.  ISIS is undeniably unique in its capacity for heinous action, but 
outlawing advocacy no matter how abstract would result in government 
eradication of an entire ideology—an unprecedented level of authoritarian 
censorship.  Third, the statute is largely directed against foreign terrorist 
advocacy.  At a pragmatic level, most speakers transmitting ISIS propaganda 
are likely to be located beyond American criminal jurisdiction.  More 
troublesome, however, is the likelihood that Muslim and Arab groups will 
be disproportionately prosecuted under this statute.  Such dragnetting is not 
uncommon in our nation’s history.202  This discriminatory impact raises a 
host of equal protection concerns. 
Whereas Posner’s measures are excessive, it can be argued that the 
licensing scheme does not go far enough.  While journalists should be held 
to high ethical standards, placing the disciplinary onus on them 
misunderstands the problem.  The vast majority of “fake news” and 
misinformation originates with ideological groups and political operatives, 
not professional journalists.  Professional licensing standards could serve as 
a valuable source identifier, assisting audiences to distinguish between 
factual information and blatant falsehoods.  However, it does little to regulate 
“alternative” forums where the most harmful forms of speech proliferate.  
Relatedly, certain audiences are severely distrustful of “legitimate” news 
sources.  Thus, several problems ignited by misinformation exist beyond the 
scope of professional journalism.   
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On the other hand, a licensing scheme could be both socially and 
constitutionally problematic if it restricted access to information.  Privileging 
facts to a distinct elite class would spur fears of indoctrination and social 
control.  Moreover, it could blur the line the free press and other elite 
institutions.  Transforming the press into an elite professional class may 
compromise its most valuable function—serving as check on political 
power.   
VI.     PROPOSED SOLUTION 
This article seeks to fill academic interstices with a solution of its own.  
Inspired by prior scholarship, I propose an adjudicatory model that identifies 
and excludes conspiracy speech from Constitutional protection.  Through 
this scheme, the First Amendment can be deployed to address tangibly 
harmful expression without sacrificing its essential character.   
My solution reimagines First Amendment law by creating a doctrinal 
exception for online conspiracy speech.  Under this regime, regulation is 
permissible where there is (1) intentional (2) online proliferation of (3) 
factually false speech with a (4) demonstrable link to violent action.  In broad 
strokes, this would allow either congressional legislation or private party 
action to enjoin speech fora that meet the aforementioned criteria.  From a 
pragmatic standpoint, regulation would target moderator accounts 
responsible for housing the speech in question.  Placing liability on 
community standard-bearers ensures the model is both workable and 
effective.   
The proposed test is essentially cumulative.  Prohibition is only 
permitted where the speech at issue implicates the various market failures, 
policy concerns, and characteristics of low-value speech touched upon 
earlier in this article.  For example, because conspiracy speech houses both 
the violent proclivities of unlawful advocacy and the mis-informative 
tendencies of false expression, there is greater justification for government 
regulation.  Where these factors are triggered, the policy balance struck by 
existing doctrine destabilizes.  The potential social harm comes to outweigh 
countervailing concerns over censorship and suppression.  Put another way, 
the conspiracy speech at issue is rendered so valueless—indeed, so outside 
the realm of First Amendment concern—that it falls below first-tier 
protection.  Having more in common with obscenity, fighting words, and 
true threats, the speech becomes ripe for regulation.   
A. PROPOSED MODEL 
1. Intentional Proliferation 
Intentionality is a threshold consideration.  Suppression of online 
conspiracy speech is only warranted where either the speaker intends to 
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cause tangible harm and is aware that the speech at issue has a proclivity do 
so.  These requirements ensure that regulation is neither arbitrary nor 
draconian.  Unlike Posner’s solution, the one-off or naïve poster understands 
that she will not be legally sanctioned for participation within the online 
forum.  In essence then, the intentionality requirement places liability on the 
moderator of the online conspiracy forum rather than individual speakers.203  
This makes sense for a variety of reasons.  First, moderators exercise broad 
control over the online communities they manage.204  These individuals have 
the power to shape expressive norms, regulate forum membership, and 
curate the range of permissible content within a particular forum.205  As such, 
moderators bear responsibility for the speech environment they foster.  They 
cannot claim ignorance of the toxic nature of speech when they are directly 
involved in facilitating it.  This is particularly so where moderators, such as 
those running QAnon forums, become aware of lawless action associated 
with and inspired by their forum’s content.   
Second, fixing liability on moderators avoids the Disrupter/True 
Believer distinction mentioned in Part III.  Under the intentionality 
requirement, it does not matter whether the moderator actually believes in 
the proliferating conspiracy, or is simply wielding it for personal or political 
gain.  Personal motivation becomes irrelevant to the inquiry—and for good 
reason.  Probing the individual’s mind produces evidentiary complications.  
Discerning whether someone acted with the requisite malice sufficient to 
trigger liability is an extremely difficult threshold to meet.  Motivation can 
be ambiguous and is often comprised of cumulative and conflicting 
incentives.  An online moderator may truly believe in the speech’s content 
while also harboring awareness that dissemination improves her station or 
accomplishes a personal goal.  These considerations merely distract from the 
issue at hand. By focusing on the intention to disseminate despite awareness 
of harm, this test avoids these complications.  The requisite showing simply 
requires a finding of (1) constructive awareness of tangible harm followed 
by (2) continued proliferation.   
Third, moderator liability assuages pragmatic concerns.  In online fora, 
where thousands of people interact anonymously, it can be difficult to locate 
discrete speakers.  Moderators, on the other hand, occupy much more 
prominent roles within online communities.206  These individuals frequently 
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exhibit visible tags that draw attention to their managerial position.207  Even 
where those titles are absent, message board settings often contain 
identifying information.208  Because moderators are tasked with policing 
community norms, they must be responsive to group concern.209  Where 
forum members feel a shared standard has been violated, their first and often 
only form of recourse it to contact the moderator.210  Finally, the hierarchical 
structure of online communities ensures that moderators are frequently 
referenced by other members.211  As moderators wield significant influence 
within an online community, sub-members may quote, acknowledge, or 
appeal to moderators in espousing a particular viewpoint.212  All these factors 
combine to reduce informational costs.   
Fourth, moderator liability also limits causation issues.  As difficult as 
it is to discern the identity an anonymous online speaker, it can be even more 
difficult to pinpoint the specific incendiary post responsible for inciting 
lawless action.  Online forums house a multiplicity of different voices.  
Whereas prior manifestations of criminal incitement might resemble a 
charismatic speaker addressing an angry crowed, that dichotomy collapses 
in the online world.  Numerous and diverse posters interact with and build 
off one another, creating a collective expression.  Crowd and speaker are 
rendered one and the same.  Readers then interact with this content over time 
and at different times.  It becomes functionally impossible to identify both 
the individual post or the precise temporal moment where the reader is stirred 
to action.  This is all to say that lawlessness is not inspired by the discrete 
viewpoint of an individual speaker, but the cumulative effect of a toxic 
chorus.213  The intentionality requirement addresses this issue by reallocating 
liability to environmental management rather than the noxious content of 
individual posts   
Last, moderators often exercise control over the entire forum.  This 
control often includes a deactivation power.214  Fixing liability on the 
moderator ensures that the legal test is not a paper tiger.  Holding moderators 
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responsible would address the communal aspect of online conspiracy speech 
by shutting down the distribution site.   
Online Dissemination 
My proposed test limits conspiracy speech regulation to online 
expression.  In essence, more traditional forms of speech do not implicate 
the type of market failures spurred by electronic mediums.  Displaced from 
internet fora, conspiracy theories are again regulated by counterspeech and 
mitigated by cooling periods.  “Real-world” expression does not amplify 
immediately to global audiences.  In-person conspiracies are not confined 
within dangerous echo chambers.  The conditions for market failure—
conditions that catalyze the need for regulation in the first instance—are 
absent from consideration.  Put another way, traditional conspiracy speech 
does not functionally realign the policy balance struck by Supreme Court 
precedent.  By restricting regulation to online conspiracy speech, my 
proposed solution supplements Brandenburg rather than displaces it.   
As such, the proposed model is faithful to principles of stare decisis.  
Creating a new test for online conspiracy speech avoids the difficult policy 
decisions inherent in abandoning canonical, and largely workable, doctrine.  
Legal change need not be so black and white.  Rather, the supplementary 
approach simply conscribes Brandenburg to the situations it was originally 
envisioned to govern.  As commentators have noted, the Justices in 
Brandenburg could not have possibly imagined the communicative 
intervention caused by the internet.215  We can accept that premise as true 
without necessarily implying that the decision must be discarded.  As such, 
Brandenburg can continue as the standard for tangible incidents of criminal 
incitement while online conspiracy speech can be assessed under a different 
legal test.   
2. Factual Falsity 
Third, my proposed solution limits regulation to speech that is factually 
false.  This requirement has two prongs.  First, the speech at issue must be 
expressed as factual.  The legal test only implicates speech that purports to 
describe reality as it actually exists.  Second, the factual expression must be 
capable of being objectively disproved.   
The first prong seeks to differentiate ideological advocacy from rank 
misinformation.  Distinguishing between the two is central to the test’s 
workability.  Ideas are largely sacred within free speech doctrine, falling 
squarely within the First Amendment’s core protections.216  As such, any test 
that proscribes ideology is likely to be met by strong constitutional challenge.  
On the other hand, factual falsity—negligible in value—has historically 
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received far less deference.217  The issue with conspiracy speech, as Mark 
Tushnet has deftly identified, is that factually false statements can be 
ideologically inflected.218  False claims at times come to be associated with 
higher forms of expression, such as politics, religion, and philosophy.219  
Despite that complication, the ideological inflection of any particular fact 
exists on a spectrum rather than on a distinct plane.  Some facts bare closer 
relation to lofty ideals.220  Moreover, some ideas are considered more 
valuable—and thus receive more protection—than others.  Such a spectrum 
necessarily implies a point where the negative value of the factually-false 
expression outweighs the value produced by ideological association.  While 
that may be a conceptually difficult distinction to make, it is necessary to 
regulate the tangible threats posed by online conspiracy speech.  Moreover, 
there are factors to assist judicial decision-making.   
The primary indicator is where speech is phrased as empirical rather 
than ideological.  Put a different way, the speech at issue must be descriptive 
rather than normative.  Any proscribed messaging should intend to describe 
world conditions as they objectively exist rather than advocating what they 
should be.  Here, the evidentiary touchstone is confusion.  The key 
distinction between ideological advocacy and the spread of misinformation 
exists in the discrepancy between persuasion and deception.  Advocacy 
implies a certain awareness on the part of the listener.  Ideological 
participants understand they are subscribing to a particular worldview—
there is conscious choice to adopt a value system consistent with preexisting 
beliefs and normative ideations.  Even where ideologues understand their 
beliefs to be “true” or superior, there is a recognition that competing 
philosophies exist.  On the other hand, individuals misled by conspiracy 
speech may be naïve to the fact they are being deceived.  Agency drops from 
the equation.  Rather, the conspiracy theory is received as singular and 
objective fact, warping the way listeners interact with the world around them.  
There are countless stories from former QAnon believers recounting feelings 
of delusion and betrayal.221  These individuals suffered tangible harms for 
participation in the conspiracy, including losses of time, resource, familial 
association, and even personal liberty.222  This plethora of evidence makes it 
possible to differentiate between descriptive and normative expression. 
Second, it must be possible to objectively disprove the speech at issue.  
As David Han posits, the conspiracies must live in the “realm of 
demonstrable falsity.”223  This means that the speech does not purport to 
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describe nebulous realms outside the grasp of human knowledge.224  There 
are some topics that fundamentally evade understanding.  It is impossible, 
for instance, for any one person to concretely prove the existence of God, or 
alternate dimensions, or the possibility of extraterrestrial life.  Implicating 
any of these topics would result in expressive chill and potentially curtail 
scientific advancement.  As such, these issues fall without the proposed test.  
On the other hand, some factual claims are easily disproven.  For example, 
satellite imaging clearly shows that earth is spherical rather than flat.225  
President Obama’s birth certificate expressly refutes that he was born in 
Kenya.226  Finally, a basic floor plan of Comet Ping Pong pizzeria negates 
the existence of a basement pedophilia ring.227  Counterevidence of this 
nature brings conspiracy speech within the regulatory ambit.   
3. History of Violence 
The final factor requires that speech be linked with a demonstrable 
history of violence.  Conspiracy speech of the type imagined here produces 
real-world, physical injury.228  Any regulated speech then must be associated 
with tangible manifestations of violent action.  There are three important 
points to clarify.  First, psychic injury falls below the relevant threshold for 
speech regulation. While psychological harms are undoubtedly damaging to 
the individual, they are difficult to both quantify and prove.  Attempting to 
discern when exactly expression caused emotional injury—and the 
magnitude of such injury—results in evidentiary challenges.  Limiting 
regulation to violent crime avoids these issues.  Second, the speech must 
inspire the violent action in some way—it is not enough that the expression 
be obliquely associated with lawless behavior.  While the temporal 
connection need not be imminent, there must be some causal link between 
the speech and lawless act.  Third, regulation under this test requires a history 
of violent action rather than a few isolated incidents.  This ensures that 
speakers and moderators are not held accountable for the behavior of discrete 
bad actors.  Criminal law correctly places liability on criminal defendants for 
the individual manifestations of violent conduct.  Requiring a discernible 
violent legacy ensures that regulatory focus remains on expression.  Each of 
these three requirements prevent regulation from becoming overbroad.   
Finally, association with past violence avoids prior constraint issues.  
Under this factor, speech and speech forums are allowed to proliferate until 
they become incontrovertibly related to social harm.  In this light, the 
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proposed model avoids prospective chill.  Regulation can only proceed in 
retrospect. 
B. AREAS OF CONCERN 
Although my proposed model attempts to find the least-restrictive 
means by which to regulate conspiracy speech, it is far from perfect.  Like 
any expressive limitation, fixing the correct policy balance implicates 
tradeoffs.  Some may find the test unduly restrictive while others argue it 
does not go far enough.  New doctrine inspires new, and often perceptive 
criticism—these are the wages of policymaking. 
As an initial matter, one could plausibly assert that the proposed 
exception is too narrow to warrant judicial consideration.  Put another way, 
the suggested model seems acutely limited to conspiracies such as QAnon 
and Pizzagate.  Although the test is well-suited to address these heartland 
concerns, the next conspiracy theory may implicate new issues requiring 
different legal factors.  The propensity of conspiracies to originate and 
transform would lead to constant judicial tinkering.  While that criticism is 
warranted, my proposed solution may still find broader applicability.  
Consider a situation where an online forum spreads scientifically refutable 
misinformation that a particular racial group is responsible for a discrete 
social malady.  Believing the theory to be true, conspiracy participants go on 
to violently assault members of that racial class.  Although posed in general 
terms, this is hardly a hypothetical circumstance.  As of this writing, Asian 
Americans and Asian Pacific Islanders continue to experience racially-
motivated attacks stemming from a purported connection to the COVID-19 
virus.229  Despite demonstrable falsity—along with significant public 
awareness campaigns— people continue to mistakenly blame this 
demographic group for the inception and spread of the pandemic.230  Under 
the proposed test, government regulators could shut down the online forum 
spreading such misinformation. 
The issue of cyberterrorism is a more difficult case.  Although 
cyberterrorist advocacy intentionally disseminates socially-harmful 
messaging across electronic fora, it frequently implicates high speech 
concerns.231  Terrorist advocacy then may be too ideologically inflected to 
meet the proposed standard.  In particular, where terrorist speech is driven 
by religious fundamentalism, such expression may find safe harbor within 
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the core of the First Amendment.  More still, speech of this nature is difficult 
to factually disprove.  Terrorist expression may not lay claim to objective 
reality, but rather advocate the supremacy of a particular world vision.  Such 
normative, prescriptive speech would seemingly render the proposed model 
overbroad.  As such, supplemental methods may be required to curb terrorist 
advocacy. 
Further, placing liability on forum moderators, rather than discrete 
speakers, could be met with a Claiborne Hardware challenge.232  Claiborne 
generally limits associational liability in speech contexts.  To overcome 
Claiborne’s general proscription, the government must show that (1) the 
advocacy group’s goals were unlawful and (2) that its members intended to 
further those goals.233  Where conspiracy theories have a history of 
demonstrable violence, however, they might meet this high standard.  
Continued dissemination of false speech despite awareness of its propensity 
to cause social harm would seemingly satisfy both prongs of the Claiborne 
test.  Further, the false nature of conspiracy speech may render Claiborne 
distinguishable.  Whereas the boycott at issue in Claiborne implicated 
political speech at the heart of the First Amendment, demonstrably false 
speech is more susceptible to regulation.234 
Moreover, requiring legacies of violent action could rightfully trigger 
humanitarian criticism.  Specifically, delaying regulation until speech can be 
tangibly linked to repeated instances of violence appears as mistaken 
prioritization.  I tend to agree with this assessment.  Allowing toxic 
expression to transform into tangible harm feels like sacrificing life at the 
altar of speech.  At the same time, the presiding speech regime has 
determined that this is the price paid for free expression.  In order to maintain 
workability, the test has been specifically constructed to avoid prior restraint 
and overbreadth. 
Finally, regulating conspiracy speech may implicate more fundamental 
concerns.  Despite the borderline preposterous content espoused by QAnon 
and Pizzagate, the conspiracies essentially stem from fear of governmental 
control.  These theories evince an anxiety of autonomy—an essential distress 
that individuals no longer control their own destinies.  Rather, an entrenched 
network of elites dictates the structures and institutions that give shape to our 
social reality.  As such, fear of expressive regulation—already a paradigm 
First Amendment concern—is particularly acute in the realm of conspiracy 
speech.  Proscribing conspiratorial expression may compound feelings of 
powerlessness among believers—indeed, may provide more evidence that 
the system is rigged against them.  Should this happen, speech prohibition 
might have the ironic effect of spurring the same social harm it had originally 
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intended to regulate.  Still, this argument can be made in many scenarios.  
Fear of reprisal exists wherever the government tries to regulate dangerous 
or unstable populations.  In the meantime, people are killed, believers misled, 
and capitols breached.  Fear of reaction can never excuse inaction.   
VII.    CONCLUSION 
Conspiracy theory is increasingly becoming public reality.  Once 
considered fringe expression, the internet has legitimized conspiracy speech 
by making it available to global audiences under the guise of objective fact.  
Such issues should be considered seriously.  Conspiracies pose a threat to 
our democracy, not only figuratively, but—as congresspersons can attest 
to— literally.  Despite their farfetched content, conspiracies tend to inspire 
fervent and faithful followings.  Where passions are enflamed, and realities 
distorted, conspiracy speech can quickly become felony harm.  This is 
already happening, in violent crescendo.  The injurious legacy of QAnon 
should be instructive for legal commentators and judicial actors.  As 
conspiracies continue to generate and take new forms, First Amendment law 
must adapt in kind.   
